Sir Kevan Collins was told on his appointment as Covid catch-up tsar that he had a 鈥渂lank cheque鈥 to come up with a plan, an ex-adviser recalls.
Collins thought the country鈥檚 children needed 拢15 billion to recover the lost learning of lockdown. He got 拢1.4 billion.
鈥淚t tells you everything you need to know about the lack of seriousness from government to help schools catch children back up,鈥 says Caroline Derbyshire, the chair of the Headteachers鈥 Roundtable.
鈥淲e needed something really powerful 鈥 but we weren鈥檛 given the resources.鈥
U-turns, we鈥檝e had a few
The Covid years are not ones the Department for Education and its ministers at the time will look back on fondly.
The U-turn on exams was one of many high-profile missteps (there were five in a week in the back-to-school debacle of January 2021).
Children were left hungry as the national scheme to access free vouchers malfunctioned.
Gavin Williamson, the then education secretary, threatened to sue schools planning to close over pandemic outbreaks.
Relations between teachers and the government collapsed, with Williamson heavily blamed for the fall-out.
Angus Walker, a former broadcast journalist who become Williamson鈥檚 special adviser in April 2020, gives a view from the inside.
鈥淚t was impossible to make decisions when dealing with an unpredictable disease that was throwing up new variants.
鈥淲e were getting punched in the face day after day. But someone had to make those decisions. Covid was the reason for U-turns, not ineptitude.鈥
According to another former senior civil servant, it was an example of how the popular refrain 鈥渓isten to teachers鈥 begs the question 鈥渨hich teachers?鈥
While some heads wanted a lot of guidance, others wanted none. 鈥淲hen the department produces something halfway between, people are outraged.鈥
But Iain Mansfield, a 鈥渆ven when things did work, the guidance was often too late, too complex and added burden for those at the coal face鈥.
鈥淭he policy environment was slightly crazy, often frenetic. And often there were no good outcomes 鈥 just a choice of evils.鈥
Splits in the Cabinet also paralysed decision-making, with the 鈥渃learance chain鈥 encompassing several departments and scientific advisers.
Another former adviser explains: 鈥淓ducation just wasn鈥檛 a priority in the pandemic. It wasn鈥檛 that No 10 had too much power. It wasn鈥檛 a Gavin problem. We repeatedly closed schools because we were worried about people over 80 dying of Covid.鈥
The pandemic鈥檚 aftermath should have been a chance for the government to repair some of the damage. Boris Johnson had said education was his 鈥渂iggest priority鈥, pledging a 鈥渕assive catch-up operation鈥. Things were looking up.
Treasury takeover
Collins鈥 plan, costed at 拢15 billion, was based on three Ts: tutoring, training and time. Most of the money was needed for extending the school day.
Despite getting to within a few hours of signing off on a 拢10 billion package, 鈥渢he Treasury knobbled the PM鈥, says one former adviser. It was supposedly done over pizza.
Just 拢1.4 billion was announced. Collins resigned.
Sir Kevan Collins
Walker says: 鈥淚 couldn鈥檛 understand why the enthusiasm for things like Covid support loans, furlough, 鈥榚at out to help out鈥 wasn鈥檛 the same for schemes to help children.
鈥淚t seemed the Treasury regarded businesses as investment, but education as a cost.鈥
Policy expert Sam Freedman writes the 鈥渦nusually powerful鈥 Treasury 鈥渆ssentially holds veto power over everything that happens in government, meaning it sets the de facto strategy鈥.
It also causes practical problems. An internal row between Williamson and the Treasury over the National Tutoring Programme (NTP) led to an embargoed press release having to be reissued just hours before it was due to go live.
Williamson wanted a two-year scheme, and had secured 拢350 million to do it. But the Treasury wouldn鈥檛 commit to multi-year funding.
鈥淵ou can’t physically spend that amount of money on tutoring in one academic year,鈥 recalls Walker.
Instead, politicians just pretended to the sector 拢350 million was to be spent over the year, which left 拢140 million unspent.
鈥淭hey announced something they knew nobody could deliver,鈥 adds Ben Gadsby, head of policy at Impetus. 鈥淚t was a focus on media exceeding the focus on deliverability.鈥
鈥楪overnment knows best鈥
It was a muddled start for the flagship scheme, which was also a wider example of the 鈥済eneral Whitehall belief that government knows better than schools鈥, says David Thomas, a former DfE adviser.
In its first year, schools could only purchase tutoring through an approved set of providers: the government wanted to ensure schools used those it judged to be high quality.
Even at the height of the pandemic, it paid millions to payment services provider Edenred to set up a national system to access free school meal vouchers, rather than just give the cash to schools or parents to buy vouchers themselves.
It took months before the website was running smoothly. In the meantime, heads were forced to wait for hours in online queues, often into the early hours of the morning.
Sir Hamid Patel, chief executive of the Star Academies Trust, says the NTP 鈥渞equired excellent execution. And this is where we faltered.
鈥淪chools understand their pupils鈥 needs better and can tailor solutions more effectively than a centralised system.鈥
But Gadsby adds: 鈥淭he [original] tutoring routes were a bit clunky because there were restrictions built in on what schools could do.
鈥淲e were saying 鈥榟ere is an evidence-backed programme, and we want you to implement something that looks a lot like it鈥.鈥
The NTP later pivoted to hand most the cash straight to schools. For Collins, it exposed a bigger weakness.
He told TES: 鈥淭he tier between a school and the government is just too big鈥 You need something in between.
鈥淚t works very well if a school is connected to a great multi-academy trust or a great local authority, but too many schools aren鈥檛.鈥
Don鈥檛 lose long-term vision
The DfE鈥檚 procurement process also was too heavily weighted towards rewarding cheaper, rather than high-quality, bids.
It resulted in the Dutch HR company Randstad winning the contract to run the NTP in its second year.
鈥淓veryone predicted it would be a failure, and it was,鈥 recalls a former adviser.
But Mansfield adds: 鈥淲hen programmes were behind schedule, civil servants would typically just present this as a state of nature 鈥 there appeared to be no consequences for failure鈥.
As subsidies wound down, fewer than three in five schools used the tutoring programme in 2023-24.
As of May, 5.6 million tutoring courses had been started 鈥 approaching the 6 million target. Those involved say the scheme is a success, despite the issues.
But Gadsby says: 鈥淭utoring should be part of the system 鈥 but the steps for the wind-down of the subsidy were never invented.
鈥淭he NTP has actually set back the case for tutoring. The lesson is to not lose sight of the long term.鈥
The NTP has actually set back the case for tutoring. The lesson is to not lose sight of the long term
Collins says there was an 鈥渙bligation for a national endeavour and we failed at that moment鈥.
The wind down also comes as schools are hit by a tsunami of wider societal issues. There has been a huge rise in absences. A collapse in support services leaves schools overwhelmed by mental health issues, child hunger and poverty.
Schools now run more foodbanks than charitable groups.
鈥淪chools have become miniature welfare states, and yet their efforts have not been matched with additional funding or resources,鈥 adds Russell Hobby, chief executive of Teach First.
Rebuilding what Gove tore down
Ed Balls, Labour education secretary until 2010, also says Michael Gove鈥檚 decision to reform the then Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) as the DfE was an 鈥渁ct of total vandalism鈥.
鈥淲hat we were saying to schools and to families [was that] if you want a child to do well and flourish, it鈥檚 not just about their learning鈥 The influences from their family, support from parents, whether they are eating well, being supported, helped or challenged when things went wrong 鈥 all of those things had a big impact upon their learning.鈥
Gove admits: 鈥淭here was too sharp a turning away from some of the things that Ed and his team had put in the children’s plan.鈥
Jonathan Simons, a partner at Public First, says it was the 鈥渂iggest thing government ballsed up since 2010鈥, but adds: 鈥淭he wider economy, the cost of living 鈥 these are massive head winds 鈥 Collins鈥 plan would not have solved it.鈥
Collins is now back as a non-executive DfE board member under Labour, which is looking to rebuild some of the wider infrastructure that Gove tore down. It envisions schools as hubs at the heart of it.
A cross-Whitehall child poverty strategy also shows signs that Sir Keir Starmer鈥檚 team is trying to rekindle a joined-up approach across different policy areas, this time under the banner of government 鈥渕issions鈥.
That includes things such as SureStart 2.0, mental health workers in schools and supervised tooth brushing.
But Every Child Matters of 2003, which set out a framework for services that cover children and young people from birth to 19, was a pricey programme 鈥 and the cash isn鈥檛 there this time around.
鈥淔or education to have the greatest chance of transforming pupils鈥 lives, we must look at children鈥檚 outcomes holistically 鈥 addressing poverty, improving services, and boosting school funding to ensure this happens,鈥 Hobby adds.
Derbyshire calls for 鈥渂rave decisions. We had a plethora of education secretaries [under the last government]. We鈥檝e not been seen as strategically vital to the future of our country. That needs to change.鈥